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A hybrid cognitive architecture with primal
affect and physiology
Christopher L. Dancy, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Though computational cognitive architectures have been used to study several processes associated with human
behavior, the study of integration of affect and emotion in these processes has been relatively sparse. Theory from affective
science and affective neuroscience can be used to systematically integrate affect into cognitive architectures, particularly in
areas where cognitive system behavior is known to be associated with physiological structure and behavior. I introduce a unified
theory and model of human behavior that integrates physiology and primal affect with cognitive processes in a cognitive
architecture. This new architecture gives a more tractable, mechanistic way to simulate affect-cognition interactions to provide
specific, quantitative predictions. It considers affect as a lower-level, functional process that interacts with cognitive processes
(e.g., declarative memory) to result in emotional behavior. This formulation makes it more straightforward to connect these
affective representations with other related moderating processes that may not specifically be considered as emotional (e.g.,
thirst or stress). An improved understanding of the architecture that constrains our behavior gives us a better opportunity to
comprehend why we behave the way we do and how we can use this knowledge to recognize and construct a more ideal
internal and external environment.
Index Terms— Cognitive Models, Modeling human emotion, Mood or core affect, Emotion theory

—————————— u —————————

INTRODUCTION

T

he human mind is a complex biological system that
operates as a computational system to behave within
its environment. Given this (immense) complexity, it
can be useful to breakdown the mind into hierarchies to
develop models and simulate behavior of the human
mind and human behavior (e.g., [1]). Indeed, this idea
has been used to begin to develop integrative models of
human physiology relevant for understanding and
predicting behavior of several aspects of physiology [2].
Hierarchy is a useful concept when discussing a very
difficult aspect of modeling human behavior,
computational models of emotion.
Several computational models of emotion or affect
have been proposed and developed into systems that can
be run through simulations (e.g., see [3, 4] for a useful
overview). Progress in developing unified computational
models and systems that integrate theory in affect and
emotion remains slow relative to the overall activity in
unified computational models of human behavior.
Nonetheless, there have been useful developments of
computational models of emotion that provide unified
computational accounts of human behavior [5-9].
Marsella and Gratch [5] and Marinier III, et al. [8]
implement computational models of appraisal processes
[10] and their effects of cognition by implementing this
appraisal process within versions of the Soar cognitive
architecture [11]. MicroPsi [9] provides a useful hierarchy
of urges (physiological, cognitive, and social) that
modulate behavior of the system, albeit in way that is
more concerned with intelligent agent behavior, than
•
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particularly intelligent human behavior. Clarion [7] uses
lower-level (e.g., related to eating) and higher-level (e.g.,
relating to belonging to a group) drives to approximate
emotions. More recently, Juvina, et al. [6] use core affect
[12] to break down emotion into valence and arousal and
have these modulate cognitive processes.
All these computational systems use hierarchies to
model and simulate interactions between emotion and
cognitive systems, albeit with different representations
and components. It remains less clear how these systems
may handle the interaction between emotional processes
and other cognitive moderators [13] that are not
emotional, but nonetheless may influence affective and
cognitive processes. It may be difficult to develop models
that can realistically and tractably combine moderators
(including emotion) and simulate their effects on
behavior (e.g., the combination of being tired, caffeinated,
and in a fearful state).
Panksepp [14] offers a useful hierarchy that can
begin to approach the previously mentioned problem
and can be used to separate emotional experience into
increasingly complex levels. They postulate a continuum
of processes (Fig. 1) to represent the processing that
mediates human thinking and behavior and use the
organization of neural systems as a basis for this
formulation.

behavior. This formulation gives us the opportunity to
understand a wide range of behavioral moderators and
representations that can be used to tractably understand
how multiple moderators (affective or otherwise) may
interact to affect behavior.
In the next sections, I provide an overview of some
connections between physiological and affective systems,
and how these interactions can affect cognitive processes.
I then describe a hybrid cognitive architecture with
physiology and affect and an affective-cognitive agent
that runs within the architecture. Lastly, I discuss
limitations and potential future work related to the
architecture.

Memory-based
interpretations of
past and future
affective states

Primary-Process
Level

PHYSIOLOGICAL-AFFECTIVE SYSTEMS
Top-down
Effects

Bottom-up
Effects

Conditioned stimuli
and responses
(e.g., affective memory
processing in the Basolateral Amygdala)

(subcortical, affective systems that
provide motivational value to representations)

Global Modulating processes
(e.g., norepinephrine, dopamine)

Fig. 1. Panksepp [16] describes levels of processing that mediate
behavior. This spans from the more general global modulating
processing to the metacognitive processes used to internally reflect
upon experience.

Thus, it is useful to think about emotion as the
intersection between these levels. Put another way,
emotion is the result of feeling some combination of
affect and having that affect interact with cognitive
processes. This allows us to separate subjective reports of
emotional experience, from affective experience that can
be inferred from physiological or behavioral change but
are nonetheless inaccessible to awareness or unconscious
(e.g., [15-17]).
Panksepp and Biven [18] posit several systems that
are on the primary-process level and are implemented by
neural circuits that cause affect. Most important for this
paper are the SEEKING and FEAR systems that mediate
appetitive motivations (e.g., those that are activated by
hunger) and some response to aversive stimuli (e.g., a
powerful shock), respectively. Though aspects of the
FEAR system and circuit have been the most dominantly
studied, the SEEKING system may be considered as, if
not more, fundamental to human behavior.
I use the primary-process affect theory to connect a
unified theory of cognition to an integrated model of
physiology. I have implemented this multi-level model in
a hybrid cognitive architecture that can be used to
simulate and predict interactions between physiological,
affective, and cognitive processes and how they mediate

Nonlinear physiological processes interact with affective
and cognitive processes across time. To develop a
realistic, tractable computational theory of emotion that
can be applied to real-world situations we often
encounter, it is important to directly consider the
underlying physiological processes that affect behavior
both in the face of and in the absence of affective stimuli.
In the proceeding sections, I discuss two areas of
physiological-affective systems that are important to
studying human behavior in realistic contexts and thus
important for any computational model of human
behavior that seeks to develop a comprehensive account
for behavior across time in varying contexts. First, I
discuss the physiological bases for hunger and thirst, and
their interactions with existing affective systems. I also
discuss sleep, stress, and arousal from an integrative
physiological systems perspective; when taken from this
perspective, it becomes clearer how these concepts can all
be related, especially as it pertains to developing
systematic, integrative computational models of emotion.
Lastly, I discuss some of the many interactions these
physiological systems have with memory.

Hunger and thirst
Hunger and thirst describe basic physiological-affective
processes that govern our behavior, potentially in subtle
ways (e.g., [19]). Changes in homeostatic physiological
processes modulate peripheral and central systems to
create certain SEEKING behavior (or wanting behavior,
[20]), where behavioral tendencies begin to reflect the
homeostatic need of particular physiological systems.
(Because of the similarities between the theories, I will
use SEEKING/wanting when discussing this system.) To
understand and quantify how physiological-affective
systems may interact to modulate human behavior, it is
important to gain an understanding of processes that
mediate these systems. Hunger and thirst both represent
particularly useful homeostatic processes as they’ve been
extensively studied and heavily involve hypothalamic
nuclei. This known connection with neural substrates
gives one a more straightforward way to connect existing
models in this area with work done with affective (and
other behavioral) neural systems.

Hunger behavior involves several peripheral
regulators, including leptin [21], ghrelin [22], blood
glucose [23], and insulin [24] which cause changes in
bodily need states and thus changes to hunger-related
appetitive and consummatory behavior [25]. Though
these changes sometimes manifest themselves as overt
behavior, they can also be more covert throughout the
day, potentially biasing affective and cognitive processes
to behaviors that encourage (or discourage) behaviors
related to food cues (e.g., [26]). This bias of processes is
facilitated through the hypothalamus, more specifically
through the lateral and ventromedial hypothalamic
nuclei (LH and VMH, respectively). The LH acts as an
excitatory neural regulator, while the VMH is important
for inhibition of hunger [25]. Thus, these densely
connected nuclei act as a middle-layer between peripheral
changes indicating bodily need in the form of hunger,
and affective processes that modulate behavior.
Thirst and hunger are linked in many ways including
salt appetite, that is, salt appetite and thirst typically have
an inverse relationship. This is because homeostasis
related to thirst (fluid homeostasis) involves mechanisms
that maintain a balance between sodium and water
balance. As with hunger, behavioral biases that are
generated from homeostatic modulation can often
manifest as behavior that is overtly thirst-appetite (e.g.,
taking a drink of water) or more covert (e.g., causing
changes in perception to related stimuli; [27]).
These physiological-affective interactions have
consequences for behavior in larger contexts. For
example, Danziger, et al. [19] show that hunger may have
unintended consequences on something as serious as
judicial decisions. The authors showed that the
proportion favorable judicial decisions after a food break
was approximately 65% while just before the break, the
proportion had dropped all the way down to 0%; this is
with a beginning proportion of around 65% that steadily
declined until the food break was taken. As a way to
show general overlap of neural processes that modulate
thirst and SEEKING/wanting behavior, Winkielman, et
al. [16] studied effects of unconscious affective stimuli
(happy or angry faces). They found that those who were
unconsciously exposed to happy faces poured and drank
more of a sugar beverage. In addition, the authors also
found that study participants exposed to happy faces
were willing to pay more money for a can of that
beverage. For thirsty participants, unconscious stimuli
affected water pouring and consuming behavior, as well
as the amount participants were willing to pay for the
water. In an interesting study (due to its control and
objective and subjective thirst), Wright, et al. [28] used a
primary motivation and reward (i.e., thirst and water)
version of the ultimatum game (which typically uses
money as the main reward; [29]). In the study, the
participants had a choice that resulted in a tradeoff of
rejecting an unfair offer from what they believed to be
another participant (a 12.5% distribution of a drink of
water for the participant and 87.5% for the other
participant) versus accepting the offer (and thus getting a
drink of water). The authors found that physiological

thirst (i.e., osmolarity) failed to make a statistically
significant difference on participants’ choice. However,
subjective thirst did affect their choice, with participants
who accepted the offer showing a higher subjective thirst
that was statistically significant. This shows (in a
laboratory setting) that affective processes can modulate
higher-level cognitive processes that may balance
absolute self-interest and fairness. A person may be more
likely to accept unfair offers when those offers are
directly related to a physiological need.
Thus, even in cases where a decision or action may
not be directly related to a human’s hunger or thirst state,
such a state may affect the outcome of said decision or
choice of said action. When the state and decision are
related, there may be an especially pervasive change in
behavior. Physiological motivational states can be
pervasive and have global consequences on affective and
cognitive processes that influence human behavior. It is
important to develop models that consider these
consequences and how they may affect memory,
learning, and decision-making (e.g., [30]). I address how
one may represent this affective-cognitive interaction in a
computational model and architecture in Integrating the
theory into a computational architecture.

Sleep, stress, and arousal
Humans are bombarded with stressors that cause
physiological (and behavioral) adaptation. Though this
adaptation is generally referred to as stress, the term
stress, itself, is not as useful without specificity of the
stressor and the processes that change because of this
stressor. Often, stress is characterized by an activation of
several systems including the hypothalamic-pituitary
adrenal (HPA) axis and the Locus-Coeruleus
noradrenergic system [31]. The latter system is a main
driver in changes in arousal as the system that releases the
excitatory neurotransmitter noradrenaline.
Several
psychological,
physiological,
and
environmental changes may cause adaptation that lead to
stress on the body. One of the common stressors that can
lead to pervasive allostatic changes in physiological and
cognitive systems is sleep deprivation [32]. Variables
associated with the HPA-Axis (e.g., Corticotropin
Releasing
Hormone
[CRH],
Adrenocorticotropic
Hormone [ACTH], and cortisol) are characterized by a
diurnal cycle (i.e., circadian rhythms). This rhythmic
release of the hormones is disrupted by sleep deprivation
[33], causing physiological and behavioral adaptation to
offset these effects. Sleep deprivation and disruption also
affects the LC-Noradrenergic system as this system
receives input from neural systems important for the
sleep-wake cycle, that is, the LC-Noradrenergic system
receives inhibitory input from sleep promoting systems
[33].
Sleep deprivation is known to cause several
behavioral deficits, all of which may be caused by
modulation of cognitive processes [34-36]; though see
[37] for a counterexample task in which behavioral
deficits were not found. Given work linking stress-related
physiological variables and memory modulation [38, 39],

and the effects that sleep changes have on these variables,
one can begin to construct a computational process
model of the effects of sleep changes on cognition. In
linking these physiological changes with changes in
cognitive processes (through known neural and
behavioral modulation) one can develop a more unified
process model of sleep-deprivation, stress, and arousal
and their effects on behavior. This would be useful for
more tractable and nuanced understanding of how these
physio-cognitive interactions mediate behavior.
In the next sections I discuss connections between the
physiological-affective systems I have discussed thus far,
and memory systems. I then describe a computational
model that links these physio-affective-cognitive
processes and can be integrated into a unified
architecture (the implementation of which is discussed
later in Integrating the theory into a computational
architecture).

Physiological-affective systems and memory
Developing a computational understanding of the
physiological processes that interact with (and in some
cases partially govern) affective and cognitive processes
allows one to move beyond a static noise representation in
a cognitive system. With a computational model, we can
trace changes and can begin to understand how
physiology may change a cognitive system over-time.
Related to the previous sections, I focus on changes to
physiology that cause changes in primary affective
systems, namely the effect of hunger and thirst on the
SEEKING/wanting system, as well as stress-related
physiology and effects on memory.
Hunger, Thirst, and Affect
As mentioned previously, primary homeostatic
systems (i.e., hunger and thirst here), interact with
affective processes to enact behavioral changes that help
restore balance of those related systems. It appears these
behaviors are related to various brain neural processes
that connect the sensing of peripheral homeostatic
imbalance with the downstream dopaminergic system
that is the primary driver behind the SEEKING/wanting
system. Perhaps most important at a high-level is the
connections between the lateral hypothalamus (LH) and
the ventral tegmental area (VTA), the latter of which is
responsible for the widespread release of dopamine, the
main
neurotransmitter
implicated
in
the
SEEKING/wanting system and related affect [18].
These connections are affected by several hormones,
with Orexin being one of the more notable mediators in
homeostatic-imbalance, affect connections. Orexin is
related to several peripheral changes that relay a hungerbased need (e.g., glucose, insulin, and leptin changes;
[21]), relay a thirst-based need [40], and it is one of the
major excitatory systems involved in sleep onset [33].
Subcortical basal ganglia (BG) structures are
important for linking the previously mentioned
physiological sensors, the SEEKING/wanting system, and
behavioral output. Berridge [20] formulates the incentive
salience theory that postulates a separate wanting and

liking system, the former of which is mediated by the
discussed dopaminergic system and its effects on the
ventral striatum (which is a part of the BG). Berridge [20]
notes the importance of the affective (or motivational)
effect of this system as it relates to behavior and learning.
Thus, though the two systems come from separate
theories, the wanting and SEEKING system are
functionally similar.
These structures are also important in linking the
SEEKING/wanting system with learning, particularly
aligning well with reinforcement learning related the
dopaminergic system. Incentive salience theory provides
an account for wanting affect and its effect on
reinforcement learning processes, including how wanting
and liking differ in this learning-behavior process. In
addition to effects of SEEKING/wanting system affect on
memory related to processing in the BG, this system also
modulates declarative memory systems primarily
mediated by medial temporal lobe (MTL) system that
includes the hippocampus [41, 42]. Dopamine modulates
the declarative memory learning process by affecting
long-term potentiation (LTP) in the hippocampus,
causing more stable memories that are more difficult to
forget [41]; this effect on LTP is also relevant to the
computational architecture that is discussed in Integrating
the theory into a computational architecture as the
architecture’s declarative memory system has a
functional account for LTP (see [43] for more discussion
on this declarative memory-LTP connection). The
modulatory power of novelty on memory elements [44]
seems to confirm the importance of affect/motivation in
this learning process (e.g., as discussed by [20]) as one
may have an intuition that as stimuli become less novel,
there would be a decrease in the accompanying positive
motivation. Relating to previous discussions, this effect of
appetitive affect on declarative memory is seen in tasks
as simple as small changes in thirst state resulting in an
increased
likelihood
of
retrieving
thirst-related
declarative memory [27]; this also is likely related to the
decision-processing seen in Wright, et al. [28].
Though presented as distinct models, with distinct
effects on behavior, these physio-affective-cognitive
processes occur with an integrated system. As we
continue to accumulate this knowledge, it is useful to pull
all of these results together into a unified model (e.g.,
[45]), ideally into a computational architecture that can be
simulated so that we may understand the assumptions of
theories and models. Simon [1] noted, “…even when we
have correct premises, it may be very difficult to discover
what they might imply”. In Integrating the theory into a
computational architecture, I present a computational
model that brings together the theory and models
previously discussed, and that is implemented into a
computational system that can be simulated. This
computational model gives an account for how affective
processes may interact with cognitive processes to
mediate behavior.

Stress and memory
Many studies on stressors focus on particularly
negative affective stimuli (stressors) to induce a
physiological change in stress-related variables. These
negative stimuli often affect portions of what Panksepp
and Biven [18] calls the FEAR system; some researchers
have changed their wording to emphasize the survival
nature of these neural circuits more recently (e.g., [46]).
The amygdala is, perhaps, the most well-known
structure in the FEAR system, however nuclei in the
central portion of the amygdala (CeA) appear to be the
central structure in causing behavioral and affective
changes related to stressors [18, 47]; indeed, the
amygdala is made up of several areas that are
functionally separable [48]. The CeA has connections
with structures such as the previously discussed lateral
hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and the
paraventricular nucleus (PVN), all of which are key
structures in physiological, affective, and behavioral
change (some of these connections are shown in Fig. 2).
The PAG has been associated with the neural processing
of several behaviors, perhaps most notably to add to this
discussion is its relation to breathing and stress (e.g., [49,
50]), as well as anxiety ([47]). Taken together, these neural
structures and corresponding systems operate on the
primary-process level (i.e., Fig. 1) and interact with global
modulating and secondary processes to mediate human
behavior.
Stressors associated with conditioned learning of
fear, which involve the basolateral and lateral amygdala
substructures [46, 51, 52], are often used to induce
aversive physiological change. Physiological changes
normally seen due to stressors can cause various effects
memory, many of which are dependent upon the timing
and nature of the stressor [38, 39]. Stress appears to cause
a switch in the use of types of memory-systems [38], that
is, it modulates the use of declarative memory and
procedural memory in behavior when both may be used
for a given task. This switch is facilitated with an increase
in both glucocorticoids (cortisol) and (neural)
norepinephrine, but typically not seen when either of
those components are absent [38]. In this formulation,
declarative memory facilitates more flexible learning
behavior, whereas procedural memory facilitates more
constrained behavior. Indeed, this relates to the ties
between exploration, exploitation, and locus coeruleus
activity: moderate activity in the locus coeruleus (and
norepinephrine levels) allows more accurate behavior,
whereas higher-than normal activity can result in
impulsive behaviors that are more habitual (greater use
of procedural memory) and may be less relevant to the
goals of the task [53].
This effect on uses of memory and learning systems
interacts with timing of the stressor, and thus the
physiological variables that mediate the stress response.
This importance of timing also applies to more affective
memory mediated by the basolateral amygdala [39].
Joëls, et al. [39] gives a useful indication of when and
how noradrenergic effects on BLA-mediated affective
memory will interact with glucocorticoid effects on the

same memory. Schwabe et al. [38] provides a related
model that provides the timing from the perspective of
(declarative-based) memory performance, learning, and
retrieval, Table 1 gives this learning-stress timing
formulation. Table 1 predicts that, for example, stress
followed by a short break (roughly 1 hour) before a
learning session results in a decreased declarative
memory performance as does stress directly before
retrieval, but after learning the item previously.
Table 1. Timing of physiological change due to stressors
interacts with the effects those stressors have on
behavior (adapted from figure in [38]). Here, breakS
denotes a shorter break time (1 hour), while breakL
denotes a longer break (a few hours to a day).
Stress-Behavior order
stress-breakS-learn-breakL-retr
stress-learn-breakL-retr
learn-stress-breakL-retr
learn-breakL-stress-retr

Effect on memory
worsened
improved
improved
worsened

Thus, stress affects both, learning based on the
physiological systems recruited during exposure to the
stressor, and timing of that recruitment relative to the
learning. Effects on specific memory systems used during
behavior are also seen: more procedural dependent
memory is used when stressors cause increases in
glucocorticoids and norepinephrine (e.g., stress from
tasks like the Trier Social Stressor Task or TSST; [54]).
This has important implications not only for the point-intime behavior on a task which may be more suited for a
specific type of memory, but also for learning stages
related to declarative and procedural memory (e.g., those
described by [55]). I describe how these ideas are
integrated into a computational model and how this
model has been implemented to make a hybrid cognitive
architecture.

INTEGRATING THE THEORY INTO A COMPUTATIONAL
ARCHITECTURE

Physiological need can cause changes in affective
systems, which, in turn, can modulate the likelihood of
thinking about memory related to that need; for example,
thoughts related to water occur more often when one is
thirsty. Conversely, thinking about an item that has been
associated with affect (through learning) can cause an
increase in related affect, that is, when thinking about a
stressful situation one may experience the affect and
physiological changes associated with that stressor. The
theory, models, and results given in previous sections
leads to a coherent computational model, which may
describe how some of these physiological, affective, and
cognitive processes interact.
With this model, we’ve focused on the FEAR system and
the SEEKING/wanting system. Fig. 2 gives a high-level
view of neural systems, as well as their relation to
physiological, affective, and cognitive systems; some
general connections between affective levels (and lower

levels, for example as indicated in Fig. 1) are also shown
in the figure. I use an existing unified theory of cognition
(ACT-R, [43, 56]) to frame the cognitive systems listed in
the Fig. 2.

Motor
ACT-R: Manual - Module

PPC

ACC

ACT-R: Imaginal

ACT-R: Goal - Module

PFC
DlPFC

Basal Ganglia

ACT-R: Goal - Buffer

CN

VlPFC

ACT-R: Procedural
VP
S/W

ACT-R: Retrieval - Buffer

NAc

Fusiform Gyrus

S/W

VmPFC/OFC
A-A

Hypothalamus
PVN

Amygdala
A-A
F

LA

DMH

ACT-R: Visual - Module

LH

S/W

SCN VMH

VTA
S/W, F

Hippocampus
ACT-R:
Declarative-Module

PAG
S/W, F

LC
Arousal

Cort

Epi

NTS
Arousal

Fig. 2. Functional systems, associated neural structures, and some
of the bottom-up connections from the primary-process affect and
global/physiological systems. A-A: Affective-Associations; ACC:
anterior cingulate cortex; BLA: basolateral amygdala; CeA: central
amygdala; CN: caudate nucleus; DlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; DMH: dorsomedial hypothalamus; F: FEAR; LA: lateral
amygdala; LC: Locus Coeruleus; NAcc: nucleus accumbens; NTS:
nucleus tractus solitarus; OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; PAG:
periaqueductal gray; PVN: paraventricular nucleus; PPC: posterior
parietal
cortex;
SCN:
suprachiasmatic
Nucleus;
S/W:
SEEKING/wanting; VlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; VMH ventromedial hypothalamus; VmPFC - ventromedial prefrontal
cortex; VP - ventral pallidum; VTA - ventral tegmental area.

Both the SEEKING/wanting and FEAR system have
wide ranging effects on declarative memory and
procedural memory systems (e.g., [41]). The many
studied effects make these two systems a useful starting
point for integrating primary-process affect theory into
any cognitive architecture.

Implementing the continuum: a unified
computational architecture
To develop this architecture and computational model of
emotion, we’ve connected the HumMod physiological
model [57] to the ACT-R cognitive architecture [43], using
theory from primary-process affect theory [18] to
represent basic affective systems (i.e., at the primaryprocess level in Fig. 1). These three models all have two
advantages for implementation in a computational
system: 1) they have a strong theoretical and empirical
basis, coming from separate disciplines (which can be
useful in providing a fairly diverse perspective); 2) the

theories have representations of either neural structures
to go along with functional systems (e.g., [56, 58]) or, in
the case of HumMod, representations at the levels of
organs and hormones. The latter provides an advantage
when using data from existing research to verify
interactions between functional systems (e.g., we can use
existing theory on the effects of stress and arousal on
behavior [38, 39, 53]).

ACT-R/Φ
ACT-R/Φ extends the ACT-R architecture with a
physiological system and an affective system. The
physiological system is composed of the HumMod model
of physiology physio module (in the ACT-R system) that
communicates between the model of physiology and the
other modules in the system (e.g., the physiological
components of arousal and their functional effects on the
declarative memory module).
The affect system is composed of the SEEKING
module, FEAR module, and affective-associations
module. The SEEKING and FEAR modules are meant to
represent behavioral functionality attributed to the
SEEKING and FEAR neural circuits posited by Panksepp
and Biven [18]. The affective-associations module is not
associated with a specific primary-process affect circuit,
and instead represents functionality of systems that
operate between the primary and secondary levels
specified in Fig. 1. In the next few sections, I discuss the
systems, including different equations used. For a
summary of the parameters used (and their function) see
the appendix.

The physiological system
The physiological system uses the HumMod
physiological model to simulate bottom-up physiological
modulation of behavior. The physiology module serves
as a communication/timing system between the
physiological model, affect system, and cognitive system.
In addition, it is used to calculate the effects of the HPAAxis and sympathetic arousal (i.e., epinephrine) on
arousal (1).
𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑙 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡) ∗ [𝛼 ∗ 𝑔(𝐶𝑅𝐻) + 𝛽 ∗ ℎ(𝑒𝑝𝑖)]

(1)

In (1) f(cort), g(CRH), and h(epi) represent
transformation of raw values of cortisol, corticotrophin
releasing
hormone
(CRH),
and
epinephrine
(respectively). In this case, the functions are simply
values normalized according to initial state baseline, that
is, each function gives an output of 1 when in a normal
state. This representation affects both procedural and
declarative memory noise (see Dancy, et al. [59] for
related work on simulating the impact of stress on
memory during a serial subtraction task). Arousal also
modulates the ACT-R production rule firing threshold when
below a nominal value.

Though the physiological model has ways to adjust
arousal related physiological variables, the canonical
model is noticeably missing an account for circadian
rhythms and sleep deprivations, as well as cyclic effects

of breathing (i.e., changes in breathing rate and their
effects on related physiological receptors, and
sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system
arousal). We’ve added to the physiological model itself
by developing extensions for circadian rhythms, sleep,
and breathing (see [34, 60] for a more detailed account of
these extensions and physio-cognitive models that
complete tasks while being modulated by these
mechanism). This is useful not only for their effects as
more global modulators on cognition (e.g., cortisol effects
on arousal and memory), but also to open the
architecture to computational representation of
interactions between sleep and affect or breathing and
affect (e.g., computational modeling sleep or breathing
effects on anxiety) and subsequent interactions with
cognitive systems.

special mechanism to adjust goal state directly, without
an account for the whole system, the memory for goals [63]
model provides a much more parsimonious and tractable
way to achieve this functionality. When combined with
the offsets used in the affective-associations module it
becomes clearer how the activation bias (which is used to
determine one’s own goal state) could then begin to affect
the goals a cognitive agent would pursue; see the final
paragraph of the Affective Associations Module section
for an explanation of what I mean here by offsets.
The SEEKING module provides an integrated
functional account of the interaction between appetitive
motivations and cognitive behavior (in concert with the
affective-associations module). Another important
system and module is, in some ways, at the opposite end
of the spectrum.

The SEEKING module

The FEAR module

As one may expect, the SEEKING module is based on the
SEEKING/wanting system previously discussed. In the
architecture, this system and module are key to
appetitive motivation and behavior, for example, feeling
thirsty and changing one’s goals to more readily reflect
this affective state of thirst.
The SEEKING module acts as a major interface
between procedural memory in ACT-R and homeostatic
imbalance. The module equations below draw on work
by Zhang et al. [61] to integrate SEEKING/wanting
behavior into the existing ACT-R procedural memory
system. Equations (3) and (4) show that the utility
updated by an affective component that is determined by
the current SEEKING system value.

Where the SEEKING module represents approach,
appetitive affect related behavior, the FEAR module
represents avoid, aversive related behavior. Thus, the
FEAR module encapsulates low-level processing of
aversive stimuli (e.g., a painful shock) the module can be
directly affected by nociceptive or aural stimuli and
indirectly affected by visual stimuli. Visual stimuli do not
directly change the FEAR module state as the function of
the primary neural substrates that are involved in lowlevel processing of aversive visual stimuli are
represented in the affective-associations module.
The FEAR module principally operates independent
of the learning systems but can be affected by them
depending on the affective content in the specific
memory elements. As with the SEEKING module, the
state of the FEAR module subsymbolically affects the
declarative and procedural memory systems. The FEAR
module also has direct connections with the physiological
system and affects stress system variables (i.e., those
implicated in the architectural representation of arousal).
Equation (5) is the production updating equation that
updates production-affect values.

𝑈K = 𝑈 + log (𝑘)

(3)

𝑘 = (S + ε) ∗ 𝑒 PQRSPTUVW 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑆 ∈ 0,1

(4)

In (4), 𝑘 is specified by taking the input value from a
specific sensor system (e.g., osmolarity levels/thirst),
which I call S; a noise component is also added to S as
represented in ε. 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_S` is the maximum expected
reward that is set according to the situation by the agent
developer (see [62] for a useful discussion on setting and
scaling reward values for cognitive agents that use utility
and reinforcement learning). Functionally, these
equations allow the agent to change utility values of
procedural memory elements (rules) as the affective
context changes and environmental (internal or external)
needs change. Procedural memory elements also have
affective values directly provided by the SEEKING
module that are independent of those described in the
section on the Affective-Associations module (see (5) for
the equation which describes the almost identical FEAR
module version of the equation).
Given that it should bias our behavior towards items
that relate to certain affective states (especially when, for
example, in a physiological state of need like being
thirsty or hungry), the SEEKING module should
influence goal selection. While I could have developed a

𝐹b (𝑛) = 𝐹b (𝑛 − 1) + 𝛼( 𝑟 +

efgh (ijk)
klmn

𝑟 = log(𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅qrPPQin ∗ 𝑒 esKtUVW )

− 𝐹b (𝑛 − 1))

(5)
(6)

In (5) the delayed reward parameter 𝑘 and the
learning rate α can be set as a parameter in a model. As
with the similar TD-inspired equations discussed in the
previous two sections, 1 1 + 𝑘𝑡 is a discount function
(e.g.,) that decreases the weight of the new chunk-value
pair on the current memory hyperbolically as time
between the update of the chunk-value pair and its last
update increases. The affective (FEAR) value of the next
production from the most recent production trace is
represented by 𝐹blk 𝑛 − 1 and the variable 𝑡 is the time
elapsed since the same rule was last fired. 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅qrPPQin (6)
is the current state (value) of the FEAR system and
𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅_S` is a parameter that allows the agent to be
calibrated to the expected maximum FEAR values given

an environment; that is, the max expected FEAR affect to
be experienced in an environment.

The Affective Associations Module
The affective-associations module contains internal
memory systems that link affective states (at a point in
time) to visual, auditory, and declarative representations.
Fig. 3 gives a high-level view of these systems. I chose to
represent separate module-affect systems, focusing on
perceptual systems and the declarative memory system
(which, itself, can be considered a system to perceive the
past, [43]).

sensed simultaneously, the higher value produced
between the two is used as the reward for 𝑟) and F
represents the current state of the FEAR system (given by
the FEAR module). As previously discussed, 1 1 + 𝑘𝑡 is a
discount function used (here) to discount the FEAR value
over time.
The Affective-Associations module also modulates
declarative memory retrieval by affecting levels of
activation for those chunks that are in the corresponding
internal memory system. It adds offsets to the
subsymbolic values of a chunks based on their affect
value. Functionally, this makes it so that the more similar
the current affect state is to the one when the memory
was encoded (given the previously mentioned update
equation for multiple encodings), the more that chunk
memory element is to be retrieved (i.e., being in a fearful
state, biases the cognitive agent to retrieve memories of
other times it was afraid).

THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECT ON RESPONSES TO
UNFAIRNESS

Fig. 3. The affective-associations module provides multiple affectmemory representations and thus gives affective value to memory
elements to modulate their processing.

Separate systems were used due to existing evidence
for multiple affective memory systems [51]. These
internal memory systems can modulate both the
underlying affective state due to the context of the
cognitive system, and the cognitive state by biasing the
cognitive system towards certain behaviors due to the
current affective state; these changes operate principally
at the subsymbolic level (i.e., values that affect
probabilities of using memory representations as
opposed to directly changing the symbolic portions of
memory representations). Equations (7) and (8) show
how affect values are updated for memory
representations (I use similar sets of equations for the
SEEKING system and related values.).
𝐴b 𝑛 = 𝐴b 𝑛 − 1 + 𝛼 𝑟 +
𝑟 = argmax 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅`

e
klmn

− 𝐴b 𝑛 − 1

(7)
(8)

𝐴b 𝑛 − 1 is the previous affective value (paired with
a chunk from a perceptual system or the declarative
memory system). The 𝛼 variable is the learning rate that
controls how much each instance of a chunk-value pair
affects the overall chunk-value memory of that chunk. 𝑟
is some primary reinforcer that has the max effect on the
FEAR system at the time that the reinforcement process is
initiated (e.g., if a loud noise and a painful shock are

I used these physio-affect systems to better understand
the influence of affect on choice. Particularly, I modeled
the ultimatum game (UG), to understand how
homeostatic affect may interact with a choice that also
involves the influence of alternative goals. The ultimatum
game is a task where a proposer is given an endowment
and must propose a division of that endowment to a
second player (the responder). The responder may accept
the proposal or reject the proposal, the latter of which
results in neither participant getting any of the money.
Thus, the task involves competing goals. of
fairness/reciprocity and maximizing the amount of
money one may receive in any given round. I focus on
modeling the respondent as there exists both respondent
choice behavior data during normal ultimatum game
under a variety of proposals [64], but also choice
behavior while participants have homeostatic imbalance
that characterizes thirst [28].

Modeling the UG with and without Affect
A high-level view of the cognitive process model is given
in Fig. 4. The model processes the offer and keep (the
amount proposer offers and the amount the proposer will
keep if the offer is accepted, respectively). The model
then uses either declarative memory (past experience) or
the imaginal system (transformation of the offer-keep
into a representation of fairness) to determine whether it
is fair. It then retrieves a decision and reports either
accept or reject. The declarative memory subsymbolic
process (i.e., selection based on activation) is affected by
both the base-level activation (which is biased by both
recency and frequency) and spreading activation (which
is biased by related chunks that may be in other buffers.

Fig. 4. A high-level diagram of the information processing in the
cognitive model

I used MindModeling@Home [65] to run simulations
and find the parameter set that produced model behavior
closest to human data (see the appendix for more
information on the simulations). After finding the best
parameter combinations, I ran the model with the highest
performing set of parameters with the affective system
turned on and while varying only the 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_S` (i.e.,
from equation (4)). I used the physiological system in the
architecture to simulate hypertonic saline infusion and
create a homeostatic imbalance and run the simulation to
match the exact experimental parameters used in the
human study by Wright, et al. [28]. This homeostatic
imbalance (characterized by a change in osmolarity
similar to that reported in the aforementioned study)
then triggered a change in the SEEKING system that
primarily caused downstream effects on the model’s
decision to report an accept of the offer.

Model Results
The top three subsymbolic parameter combinations
produced an 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 of 0.058864 and 𝑅 ~ of 0.97 when
compared to those human data from [64]. Fig. 5 gives a
plot of the model with the parameter-set that produced
the highest match to human data, as well as those human
data.

Fig. 5. Acceptance Rate vs Offer-Keep for the model and Human
Data. The parameters listed above stand for the following ACT-R
parameters: ans = :ans, g-s = :ga, i-s = :imaginal-activation, fairnoise = custom noise for fairness calculation.

When using the model from Fig. 5 (with the same set
of parameters) to simulate the primary reward version of
the ultimatum game, I found that a 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_S` of 1.4
showed the closest acceptance rate (48.9%) to the 50%
reported by Wright, et al. [28] for the hypertonic
condition, while the isotonic model showed a slightly
lower 26.2% acceptance rate (vs 27% shown by [28])
when the 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_S` parameter is set to 1.75. Fig 6 also
shows a predicted higher acceptance rate for the
hypertonic model in other offer-keep conditions,
principally due to the influence of thirst-based
homeostatic affect (as shown by the general difference
between the hypertonic and isotonic models.)

Fig 6. Acceptance Rate vs Offer-Keep for the Hypertonic and
IsoTonic models (as well as Human Data). srew-max represents
𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑_S` from equation (4).

DISCUSSION
By developing a cognitive model that accounted for the
differences in acceptance rates across offer-keep ratios in
human data, I constrained the parameter space of the
physio-affective version of the model. This is a useful
exercise as it allows one to assume those parameters
would be reasonable for versions of the task that would
incur less behavioral change due to affective processes.
With this model and simulation, one also can now
explore more complex questions, like how the same
system might respond to different offers given a similar
physiological imbalance. I began to explore that question
by expanding the validated non-affective model to the
primary reward conditions studied by Wright, et al. [28].
The data from Wright, et al. [28] are limited in that they
do not indicate how thirsty individuals acceptance rate
changes over time.
The thirsty model’s acceptance rate declines as the
ratio skews towards the proposer, showing a large
decline after the offer is no longer fair. Thirsty
individuals are predicted by the model to be noticeably
more likely to accept offers that give the proposer just a
bit more water (81% acceptance rate vs 53% acceptance
rate). Thus, though there certainly is an effect of
reciprocity predicted after crossing that threshold, that
effect is greatly reduced by bottom-up homeostatic
processes. This may be counter-intuitive if one expects
that bottom-up processes should not have a large effect
on decisions that involve fairness and reciprocity. The
model predicts that thirsty individuals will show a
qualitative difference in how they treat reciprocity,
especially in cases where decisions involve quantities
deemed to be close to fair.
Future work can now include using these
simulations to understand how these physio-cognitive
processes may interact with cognitive systems in the
ultimatum game over time with repeated proposerrespondent interactions. These simulations would prove
as a useful complement to similar human studies that
would prove complex and expensive, which would limit
the scope of what could be addressed in such studies.

Limitations
While this architecture begins to pull together how we
might regard something as emotional given some set of
affective states and physiological states, the system likely
needs more specification in how top-down appraisal may
interact with the systems. This would manifest itself as a
tertiary process (e.g., “how do I feel?”). Though the
affective-associations modules does provide a way to
connect an affective state to a memory element, the
pattern-matching that leads to that affective state (or in
the implementation’s case, the affective value in a specific
system) is underspecified and will need to be expanded
to provide a more encompassing computational model of
emotion; taking lessons from existing appraisal models
(e.g. [5]) may prove useful here.
In addition, functional connections between
physiological and cognitive (as well as affective) systems
can be difficult to determine. Careful analysis of existing
literature and theory related to function/structure being
explored can be very useful here, but this remains a
difficult task and relies on the assumption that data and
theory exist.
From a practical standpoint, as the hybrid
architecture continues to add representations and uses
the already complex physiological model, computational
simulations of behavior take longer to run. This decreases
opportunities to explore the parameter space of the
system. Though it is doubtful that the system will grow
at a pace where the (computing) complexity it such that it
takes an unreasonable amount of time to run, it could
limit its uses on personal machine. The use of many of
these computational cognitive architectures on general
personal computers (especially such as ACT-R/Φ that are
available to be used by those who request it) is an
advantage for those trying to gain an initial
understanding of the systems to understand assumptions
of these implementations of theory and the behavioral
results of those assumptions.
Using the architecture to understand addiction
Both primary-process affect theory and incentive salience
theory have been used to explain addiction behavior [58,
66]. Given this has already been explored at a high-level,
using the architecture to simulate these processes would
be useful to study how the SEEKING/wanting system
might interact with cognitive systems. This would be
useful for understanding how psychiatric interventions
may affect behavior in the short and long-term, under
different circumstances.
Given the theoretical model that is implemented in
the architecture, one could hypothesize that addiction
would manifest at the subsymbolic level. Causing
difficulty in avoiding rumination related to the addiction
(e.g., [67]), a constant subversion of normal goals for
those related to addition due to these memory dynamics
(e.g., [63]), and an automatic use of basal-ganglia
mediated procedural memory and action, resulting in
behavior that occurs without much constant thought.
This continues to be a complex topic, but systems and
theories like that introduced here are useful for better

understanding and teasing apart these processes in a
systematic manner.

Evolving the affect in more complex environments
I have noted the need for a more encompassing way to
generate affect in a previous section. Simulating an
intelligent agent over in an expansive and complex
environment to interact with potentially affective stimuli
may be a useful way to build these affective value
associations. I could use a tertiary process-level system to
train on top-down representations, while also using the
physiological system to associate physiological changes
(e.g., pain) that feed directly into affective systems.
There are several environments for intelligent agents,
though there are less that are usable and provide the
possibility to expand enough to be useful in multiple
contexts for the evolution approach just mentioned.
Project Malmo [68], which extends Minecraft to make it
more accessible for AI research, may be one such system
that is useful in this context. The flexibility would be
useful, its representations translate particularly well to
ACT-R’s perceptual-attention mechanism, and Minecraft
is used by multiple age groups. The latter point provides
an interesting opportunity to explore developmentalrelated questions with a computational model of
emotion, which is an underexplored topic in the area.

CONCLUSION
That emotion affects our behavior is an intuitive idea to
many people. What is not so intuitive is just how
connected are our physiological, affective, and cognitive
states. Though we may regard physiological, affective,
and cognitive processes separately, they interact to form
an intricate and complex stream of behavior over time. I
have begun to make understanding and predicting these
interactions more straightforward and tractable with a
computational model of physiology, emotion, and
cognition that is implemented with the ACT-R/Φ
architecture.
ACT-R/Φ combines theory from the various areas in
cognitive systems, cognitive science, psychology,
neuroscience to begin to simulate and predict the
hierarchy of processes that result in emotional behavior.
An improved understanding of the architecture that
constrains our behavior gives us a better opportunity to
comprehend why we behave the way we do and how we
can use this knowledge to recognize and construct a more
ideal internal and external environment.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank Frank E. Ritter for useful discussions in some of
the original formulations of these ideas. I also thank
Robert Hester and Andrew Pruett for HumMod-related
support.

REFERENCES
[1] H.A. Simon, The sciences of the artificial, MIT press, 1996.

[2] R.L. Hester, et al., “Systems biology and integrative
physiological modelling,” Journal of Physiology, vol. 589, no. 5,
2011, pp. 1053-1060.
[3] S. Marsella, et al., “Computational models of emotion,” A
blueprint for affective computing: Crossfertilization between emotion
psychology, affective neuroscience, and affective computing, , K. R.
Scherer, et al., eds., OUP, 2010, pp. 21-41.
[4] R. Reisenzein, et al., “Computational Modeling of Emotion:
Toward Improving the Inter- and Intradisciplinary Exchange,”
IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing, vol. 4, no. 3, 2013, pp.
246-266; DOI 10.1109/T-AFFC.2013.14.
[5] S. Marsella and J. Gratch, “EMA: A process model of appraisal
dynamics,” Cognitive Systems Research, vol. 10, no. 1, 2009, pp.
70-90.
[6] I. Juvina, et al., “Modeling valuation and core affect in a
cognitive architecture: The impact of valence and arousal on
memory and decision-making,” Cognitive Systems Research, vol.
48, 2018, pp. 4-24; DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.06.002.
[7] R. Sun, “The CLARION cognitive architecture: Extending
cognitive modeling to social simulation,” Cognition and
MultiAgent Interaction, R. Sun, ed., Cambridge University Press,
2006, pp. 79-99.
[8] R.P. Marinier III, et al., “A computational unification of
cognitive behavior and emotion,” Cognitive Systems Research,
vol. 10, no. 1, 2009, pp. 48-69; DOI 10.1016/j.cogsys.2008.03.004.
[9] J. Bach, Principles of synthetic intelligence: PSI: an architecture of
motivated cognition, OUP, 2009.
[10] K.R. Scherer, et al., Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory,
methods, research, OUP, 2001.
[11] J.E. Laird, The Soar cognitive architecture, MIT Press, 2012.
[12] J.A. Russell, “Core affect and the psychological construction of
emotion,” Psychological Review, vol. 110, no. 1, 2003, pp. 145172.
[13] F.E. Ritter, et al., “CoJACK: A high-level cognitive architecture
with demonstrations of moderators, variability, and
implications for situation awareness,” Biologically Inspired
Cognitive Architectures, vol. 1, 2012, pp. 2-13; DOI
10.1016/j.bica.2012.04.004.
[14] J. Panksepp, “Empathy and the laws of affect,” Science, vol. 334,
no. 6061, 2011, pp. 1358-1359; DOI 10.1126/science.1216480.
[15] A. Öhman, et al., “On the unconscious subcortical origin of
human fear,” Physiology & Behavior, vol. 92, no. 1-2, 2007, pp.
180-185; DOI 10.1016/j.physbeh.2007.05.057.
[16] P. Winkielman, et al., “Unconscious affective reactions to
masked happy versus angry faces influence consumption
behavior and judgments of value,” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, vol. 31, no. 1, 2005, pp. 121-135; DOI
10.1177/0146167204271309.
[17] M. Tamietto and B. de Gelder, “Neural bases of the nonconscious perception of emotional signals,” Nat Rev Neurosci,
vol. 11, no. 10, 2010, pp. 697-709.
[18] J. Panksepp and L. Biven, The Archeology of Mind:
Neuroevoloutionary Origins of Human Emotions, W.W. Norton &
Company, 2012.
[19] S. Danziger, et al., “Extraneous factors in judicial decisions,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 108, no. 17,
2011, pp. 6889-6892; DOI 10.1073/pnas.1018033108.
[20] K.C. Berridge, “From prediction error to incentive salience:
mesolimbic computation of reward motivation,” European
Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 35, no. 7, 2012, pp. 1124-1143; DOI
10.1111/j.1460-9568.2012.07990.x.
[21] H.-R. Berthoud and H. Münzberg, “The lateral hypothalamus
as integrator of metabolic and environmental needs: From

[22]

[23]

[24]
[25]
[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]
[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

electrical self-stimulation to opto-genetics,” Physiology &
Behavior, vol. 104, no. 1, 2011, pp. 29-39; DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2011.04.051.
A.M. Wren, et al., “Ghrelin enhances appetite and increases
food intake in humans,” J Clin Endocrinol Metab, vol. 86, no. 12,
2001, pp. 5992; DOI 10.1210/jc.86.12.5992.
K.P. Myers, “The convergence of psychology and neurobiology
in flavor-nutrient learning,” Appetite, vol. 122, 2018, pp. 36-43;
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2017.03.048.
B.E. Levin, et al., “Neuronal Glucosensing,” Diabetes, vol. 53,
no. 10, 2004, pp. 2521.
J. Panksepp, Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and
animal emotions, OUP, 1998.
B. Seibt, et al., “Prepared to eat: How immediate affective and
motivational responses to food cues are influenced by food
deprivation,” European Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 37, no. 2,
2007, pp. 359-379; DOI 10.1002/ejsp.365.
H. Aarts, et al., “On the psychology of drinking: Being thirsty
and perceptually ready,” British Journal of Psychology, vol. 92,
no. 4, 2001, pp. 631-642; DOI 10.1348/000712601162383.
N.D. Wright, et al., “Human responses to unfairness with
primary rewards and their biological limits,” Scientific Reports,
vol. 2, 2012.
W. Güth, et al., “An experimental analysis of ultimatum
bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 3,
no. 4, 1982, pp. 367-388; DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/01672681(82)90011-7.
C.L. Dancy and D.M. Schwartz, “A computational cognitiveaffective model of decision-making,” Proc. 15th International
Conference on Cognitive Modeling, 2017, pp. 31-36.
M. Joëls and T.Z. Baram, “The neuro-symphony of stress,”
Nature Review in Neuroscience, vol. 10, no. 6, 2009, pp. 459-466.
B.S. McEwen, “Sleep deprivation as a neurobiologic and
physiologic stressor: Allostasis and allostatic load,” Metabolism
- Clinical and Experimental, vol. 55, 2006, pp. S20-S23; DOI
10.1016/j.metabol.2006.07.008.
C.B. Saper, et al., “Hypothalamic regulation of sleep and
circadian rhythms,” Nature, vol. 437, no. 7063, 2005, pp. 12571263.
C.L. Dancy, et al., “Two ways to model the effects of sleep
fatigue on cognition,” Proc. 13th International Conference on
Cognitive Modeling, 2015, pp. 258-263.
G. Gunzelmann, et al., “Diminished access to declarative
knowledge with sleep deprivation,” Cognitive Systems Research,
vol. 13, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-11; DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.09.001.
G. Gunzelmann, et al., “Sleep deprivation and sustained
attention performance: Integrating mathematical and cognitive
modeling,” Cognitive Science, vol. 33, no. 5, 2009, pp. 880-910;
DOI 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01032.x.
J.B. Bolkhovsky, et al., “Performance trends during sleep
derpivation on a tilt-based control task,” Aerospace Medicine and
Human Performance, vol. 89, no. 7, 2018, pp. 1-8.
L. Schwabe and O.T. Wolf, “Stress and multiple memory
systems: From ‘thinking’ to ‘doing’,” Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, vol. 17, no. 2, 2013, pp. 60-68; DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.12.001.
M. Joëls, et al., “Stress and emotional memory: a matter of
timing,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 15, no. 6, 2011, pp.
280-288; DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.04.004.
S.W. Hurley and A.K. Johnson, “The role of the lateral
hypothalamus and orexin in ingestive behavior: a model for
the translation of past experience and sensed deficits into

[41]

[42]

[43]
[44]

[45]
[46]

[47]

[48]

[49]

[50]

[51]

[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]

[56]
[57]

motivated behaviors,” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, vol. 8,
no. 216, 2014; DOI 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00216.
E.A. Miendlarzewska, et al., “Influence of reward motivation
on human declarative memory,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral
Reviews, vol. 61, 2016, pp. 156-176; DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.015.
J.E. Lisman and A.A. Grace, “The hippocampal-VTA loop:
Controlling the entry of information into long-term memory,”
Neuron, vol. 46, no. 5, 2005, pp. 703-713; DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2005.05.002.
J.R. Anderson, How can the human mind occur in the physical
universe?, OUP, 2007.
M. Guitart-Masip, et al., “Contextual Novelty Changes Reward
Representations in the Striatum,” The Journal of Neuroscience,
vol. 30, no. 5, 2010, pp. 1721.
A. Newell, Unified theories of cognition, Harvard University
Press, 1990.
J.E. LeDoux, “Rethinking the emotional brain,” Neuron, vol. 73,
no. 4, 2012, pp. 653-676; DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004.
J. Panksepp, et al., “The basic neuroscience of emotional
experiences in mammals: The case of subcortical FEAR
circuitry and implications for clinical anxiety,” Applied Animal
Behaviour Science, vol. 129, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1-17; DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.applanim.2010.09.014.
M.R. Delgado, et al., “Neural systems underlying aversive
conditioning in humans with primary and secondary
reinforcers,” Frontiers in Neuroscience, vol. 5, 2011; DOI
10.3389/fnins.2011.00071.
K.N. Sampaio, et al., “Role of pulmonary stretch receptors and
sympathetic system in the inhibition of reflex bradycardia
produced by chemical stimulation of the periaqueductal gray
matter of the rat,” Neuroscience, vol. 210, 2012, pp. 222-233; DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2012.02.041.
H.D. Critchley, et al., “Slow Breathing and Hypoxic Challenge:
Cardiorespiratory Consequences and Their Central Neural
Substrates,” PLOS ONE, vol. 10, no. 5, 2015, pp. e0127082; DOI
10.1371/journal.pone.0127082.
M.S. Fanselow, “From contextual fear to a dynamic view of
memory systems,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 14, no. 1,
2010, pp. 7-15; DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.10.008.
J.M. Moscarello and J.E. LeDoux, “The contribution of the
amygdala to aversive and appetitive pavlovian processes,”
Emotion Review, vol. 5, no. 3, 2013, pp. 248-253; DOI
10.1177/1754073913477508.
G. Aston-Jones and J.D. Cohen, “An integrative theory of locus
coeruleus-norepinephrine function: Adaptive gain and optimal
performance,” Annual Review of Neuroscience, vol. 28, no. 1,
2005, pp. 403-450; DOI
doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.28.061604.135709.
C. Kirschbaum, et al., “The "Trier Social Stress Test": A tool for
investigating psychobiological stress responses in a laboratory
setting,” Neuropsychobiology, vol. 28, no. 1-2, 1993, pp. 76-81;
DOI 10.1159/000119004.
J.W. Kim, et al., “An integrated theory for improved skill
acquisition and retention in the three stages of learning,”
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, vol. 14, no. 1, 2013, pp.
22-37; DOI 10.1080/1464536X.2011.573008.
J.R. Anderson, et al., “A central circuit of the mind,” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, vol. 12, no. 4, 2008, pp. 136-143.
R.L. Hester, et al., “HumMod: A modeling environment for the
simulation of integrative human physiology,” Frontiers in
Physiology, vol. 2, no. 12, 2011; DOI 10.3389/fphys.2011.00012.

[58] A. Alcaro and J. Panksepp, “The SEEKING mind: Primal neuroaffective substrates for appetitive incentive states and their
pathological dynamics in addictions and depression,”
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, vol. 35, no. 9, 2011, pp.
1805-1820; DOI 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.03.002.
[59] C.L. Dancy, et al., “Using a cognitive architecture with a
physiological substrate to represent effects of a psychological
stressor on cognition,” Computational and Mathematical
Organization Theory, vol. 21, no. 1, 2015, pp. 90-114; DOI
10.1007/s10588-014-9178-1.
[60] C.L. Dancy and J.W. Kim, “Towards a physio-cognitive model
of slow-breathing,” Proc. 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive
Science Society, Cognitive Science Society, 2018, pp. 1587-1592.
[61] J. Zhang, et al., “A neural computational model of incentive
salience,” PLoS Computational Biology, vol. 5, no. 7, 2009, pp.
e1000437; DOI 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000437.
[62] C.P. Janssen and W.D. Gray, “When, What, and How Much to
Reward in Reinforcement Learning-Based Models of
Cognition,” Cognitive Science, vol. 36, no. 2, 2012, pp. 333-358;
DOI 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2011.01222.x.
[63] E.M. Altmann and G.J. Trafton, “Memory for goals: an
activation-based model,” Cognitive Science, vol. 26, no. 1, 2002,
pp. 39-83; DOI 10.1207/s15516709cog2601_2.
[64] H. Lin and S. Sunder, “Using Experimental Data to Model
Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games,” Experimental
Business Research, R. Zwick and A. Rapoport, eds., Springer US,
2002, pp. 373-397.
[65] J. Harris, et al., “MindModeling@Home ...and anywhere else
you have idle processors,” Proc. 9th International Conference of
Cognitive Modeling, 2009.
[66] T.E. Robinson and K.C. Berridge, “The incentive sensitization
theory of addiction: some current issues,” Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 363,
no. 1507, 2008, pp. 3137-3146; DOI 10.1098/rstb.2008.0093.
[67] M.K. van Vugt, et al., “How Does Rumination Impact
Cognition? A First Mechanistic Model,” Topics in Cognitive
Science, vol. 10, no. 1, 2018, pp. 175-191; DOI
10.1111/tops.12318.
[68] M. Johnson, et al., “The Malmo platform for artificial
intelligence experimentation,” Proc. Twenty-Fifth International
joint conference on artificial intelligence (IJCAI), 2016, pp. 42464247.

Author Bios
Christopher L. Dancy received a B.S. in
Computer Science, in 2010, and Ph.D. in
Information Sciences and Technology,
with a focus on artificial intelligence and
cognitive science, in 2014, both from The
Pennsylvania State University (University
Park). He is an assistant professor of
computer science at Bucknell University.
His research involves the computational
modeling of physiological, affective, and
cognitive systems in humans. He studies
how these systems interact and what these interactions mean for
human-like intelligent behavior and interaction between humans
and intelligent systems. Chris Dancy is chair of the Behavior
Representation in Modeling and Simulation Society and a member
of ACM, AAAI, the Cognitive Science Society, NSBE, IEEE, and the
IEEE Computer Society.

